Digital Platforms: A New Natural Monopoly?
Cambridge University Press eBooks, pp. 85–112
Abstract
Network industries often exhibit natural monopoly in certain markets. Here, natural monopoly is generally attributed to high sunk and fixed costs paired with low marginal costs. This chapter explains that digital platform markets are prone to concentration not only due to this combination of fixed and marginal costs but also due to self-reinforcing feedback loops that reinforce the dominance of the largest platform operators. Platform monopoly is persistent, entrenched, and the result of structural competition issues. However, even if digital markets exhibit heavily imperfect competition or natural monopoly, competitive pressures persist as there is competition at the ecosystem level. This sets apart digital platform monopoly from non-digital natural monopoly and means that regulating these markets should happen on the basis of different principles.
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