How decentralization can generate democratic deficits-a comparative analysis of Sicily (Italy) and Zuid-Holland (Netherlands)

Regional & Federal Studies, vol. 36, pp. 319–340

Abstract

Both in Italy and the Netherlands, a series of decentralization reforms have since the 1990s shifted significant powers from the central state to subnational administrations. These reforms were motivated by powerful assumptions, among which the belief that decentralization would foster democratic accountability, representation, and transparency. Drawing a comparison between the two ‘most different’ regions of Sicily and Zuid-Holland, this article examines to what extent the anticipated democratic benefits of decentralization have materialized in practice. Based on 32 interviews with subnational politicians, the article finds that in response to decentralization, both countries have experienced a strengthening of unelected administrations (intermunicipal platforms and metropolitan cities). The rise of these administrations, the lack of clarity about their responsibilities, and the tendency towards blame-shifting between tiers have significantly weakened the quality of subnational democracy. In the end, decentralization has therefore resulted in the complete opposite of what was hoped for.

Authors 1

1. Wouter P. Veenendaal corresponding Aachen

   Leiden University

   Affiliation as printed

   Universiteit Leiden FSW Ringgold Standard Institution – Institute of Political Science