Individual Preferences for Truth-Telling

CESifo

Abstract

Contrary to the traditional economic view that individuals misreport private information to maximize material payoffs, recent evidence highlights robust preferences for truth-telling among many decision-makers. Theoretical models that align with aggregate behavioral patterns posit that these preferences arise from an intrinsic motivation to be honest and a desire to be perceived as honest. We propose a novel incentivized measure to independently capture these two motives at the individual level. We study the measure’s internal validity experimentally and show that it predicts (dis)honest behavior in other commonly used paradigms. Our approach reveals systematic heterogeneity among individuals and fairly stable type distributions across different samples. Additionally, we propose an experimentally validated 2-minute survey module that proxies both motives and predicts behavior in a typical reporting paradigm. Including this module in a large panel, we offer initial insights into how early-life experiences may shape preferences for being and being seen as honest.

Authors 3

1. Simeon Schudy corresponding

   Universität Ulm · Ifo Institute for Economic Research

   Affiliation as printed

   CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute), Poschinger Str. 5, Munich, DE-81679, Germany

   Ulm University, Albert-Einstein-Alee 11, Ulm, D-89081, Germany

2. Susanna Grundmann

   University of Cologne

   Affiliation as printed

   University of Cologne

3. Lisa Spantig Aachen

   RWTH Aachen University · University of Essex

   Affiliation as printed

   RWTH Aachen University

   University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom