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QTFlow: Quantitative Timing-Sensitive Information Flow for Security-Aware Hardware Design on RTL

arXiv (Cornell University)

Abstract

In contemporary Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools, security often takes a backseat to the primary goals of power, performance, and area optimization. Commonly, the security analysis is conducted by hand, leading to vulnerabilities in the design remaining unnoticed. Security-aware EDA tools assist the designer in the identification and removal of security threats while keeping performance and area in mind. Cutting-edge methods employ information flow analysis to identify inadvertent information leaks in design structures. Current information leakage detection methods use quantitative information flow analysis to quantify the leaks. However, handling sequential circuits poses challenges for state-of-the-art techniques due to their time-agnostic nature, overlooking timing channels, and introducing false positives. To address this, we introduce QTFlow, a timing-sensitive framework for quantifying hardware information leakages during the design phase. Illustrating its effectiveness on open-source benchmarks, QTFlow autonomously identifies timing channels and diminishes all false positives arising from time-agnostic analysis when contrasted with current state-of-the-art techniques.

Authors 7

  1. RWTH Aachen University

    Affiliation as printed

    RWTH Aachen University , Germany,

  2. RWTH Aachen University

    Affiliation as printed

    RWTH Aachen University , Germany,

  3. RWTH Aachen University

    Affiliation as printed

    RWTH Aachen University , Germany,

  4. Rebecca Pelke Aachen

    RWTH Aachen University

    Affiliation as printed

    RWTH Aachen University , Germany,

  5. Robert Bosch (Germany)

    Affiliation as printed

    Corporate Research , Robert Bosch GmbH , Germany ,

  6. Newcastle University

    Affiliation as printed

    Newcastle University ,

  7. RWTH Aachen University

    Affiliation as printed

    RWTH Aachen University , Germany,

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