Desert Retributivism: A Deweyan Critique

The Journal of Ethics, vol. 27, pp. 285–303

Abstract

Abstract In this article, I argue that Michael Moore’s (1997), and other similar formulations of desert retributivism – viz., the theory that holds punishment to be justified because of the deserved suffering it imposes on guilty offenders – are epistemically problematic. The argument draws on John Dewey’s inchoate critique of retribution, and on Dewey’s more general contention that the justification of ethical judgments and principles proceeds ex post – viz., that it depends on the experiences elicited by acting on those judgments and principles. Based on Dewey’s ex post take on justification, I more specifically argue that, given its commitment to moral naturalism and to coherentism, Moore’s version of desert retributivism is epistemically unwarranted. This is because we have evidentially grounded reasons to think that many of the retributive judgments that underlie the principle of retributive justice are not clearly supported ex post in the relevant, desert retributivist sense.

Authors 1

1. Andrei Poamă corresponding Aachen Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

   Leiden University

   Affiliation as printed

   Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Leiden University, Den Haag, Netherlands