Equilibria of Attacker-Defender Games

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

Abstract

Attempts at predatory capture may provoke a defensive response that reduces the very value of the predated resource. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of simultaneous-move, two-player Attacker-Defender games that model such interactions. When initial endowments are equal, Attackers win about a third of such games in equilibrium. Under power disparities, Attackers become particularly aggressive when they are approximately one-third poorer than Defenders. With non-conflictual outside options Attackers become exceptionally aggressive when their opponent has access to high-benefit, low-cost production, and refrain from attack most when they are unilaterally provided with a high-benefit, high-cost production option.

Authors 3

1. Zsombor Zoltán Méder Aachen Institute of Psychology, Leiden University

   Leiden University

   Affiliation as printed

   Institute of Psychology , Leiden University , Netherlands

2. Carsten K. W. De Dreu Aachen Institute of Psychology, Leiden University

   Leiden University

   Affiliation as printed

   Institute of Psychology , Leiden University , Netherlands

3. Jörg Gross

   University of Zurich

   Affiliation as printed

   Department of Psychology , University of Zürich , Switzerland