Conclusion
Cambridge University Press eBooks, pp. 350–371
Abstract
The conclusion synthesizes the findings and, on that basis, discusses how the European Court of Justice should have positioned itself in relation to the change in the Founding Contract. It first reflects on the constitution of the Union and shows that this fits the tradition of the ‘constitutional contract’. It then discusses what consequences this has for constitutional actors, including the Court, when faced with a crisis like the one in the currency union. The initiation of the change in the Founding Contract by the heads of state or government on 11 February 2010 was a political act, an exercise of constitutional power outside the law. However, this exercise of political power does receive recognition in the law, in particular, through the principle of loyal cooperation. When the Court has to rule on a measure that has proven essential to preserve the Founding Contract in an emergency, it is under a duty of loyalty to abstain from disapproving it. Yet, instead of assessing and approving such measures on the merits, as the Court did in Pringle and Gauweiler , it should have acted on its duty by silence.
Authors 1
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Affiliation as printed
Universiteit Leiden
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