Particularism

Cambridge University Press eBooks, pp. 131–159

Abstract

Chapter 6 explores the relation between scale and particularism, defined as targeted efforts by politicians to cultivate the support of specific citizens or groups of citizens (aka clients), and the allegiance of those citizens to their leader (aka patron). We begin by sketching a theory of how scale might impact particularism, arguing that scale affects the efficiency of particularistic strategies, politicians’ opportunities to monitor compliance, mutual feelings of obligation between patron and client, and opposition to particularistic politics. On the basis of these assumptions, we expect higher levels of particularism in smaller communities. Next, we examine the question empirically using a variety of indicators including partisanship, targeted campaign expenditures, pork or earmarks, constituency service, vote-buying, clientelism, and corruption. Our analysis tends to confirm the notion that smaller polities, and smaller districts, are especially prone to the development of particularistic ties between leaders and their constituents. We however do not regard extant studies of size and corruption as dispositive. A brief conclusion draws together the results of these analyses.

Authors 2

1. John Gerring

   The University of Texas at Austin

   Affiliation as printed

   University of Texas, Austin

2. Wouter P. Veenendaal Aachen

   Leiden University

   Affiliation as printed

   Universiteit Leiden