Side-channel countermeasures utilizing dynamic logic reconfiguration: Protecting AES/Rijndael and Serpent encryption in hardware

Microprocessors and Microsystems, vol. 78, pp. 103208

Abstract

Dynamic logic reconfiguration is a concept that allows for efficient on-the-fly modifications of combinational circuit behavior in both ASIC and FPGA devices. The reconfiguration of Boolean functions is achieved by modification of their generators (e.g., shift register-based look-up tables) and it can be controlled from within the chip, without the necessity of any external intervention. This hardware polymorphism can be utilized for the implementation of side-channel attack countermeasures, as demonstrated by Sasdrich et al. for the lightweight cipher PRESENT. In this work, we adapt these countermeasures to two of the AES finalists, namely Rijndael and Serpent. Just like PRESENT, both Rijndael and Serpent are block ciphers based on a substitution–permutation network. We describe the countermeasures and adjustments necessary to protect these ciphers using the resources available in modern Xilinx FPGAs. We describe our implementations and evaluate the side-channel leakage and effectiveness of different countermeasures combinations using a methodology based on Welch’s t-test. Furthermore, we attempt to break the protected AES/Rijndael implementation using second-order DPA/CPA attacks. We did not detect any significant first-order leakage from the fully protected versions of our implementations. Using one million power traces, we detect second-order leakage from Serpent encryption, while AES encryption second-order leakage is barely detectable. We show that the countermeasures proposed by Sasdrich et al.are, with some modifications, successfully applicable to AES and Serpent.

Authors 5

1. Petr Socha corresponding

   Czech Technical University in Prague

   Affiliation as printed

   Czech Technical University in Prague, Faculty of Information Technology, Czech Republic

2. Jan Brejník

   Czech Technical University in Prague

   Affiliation as printed

   Czech Technical University in Prague, Faculty of Information Technology, Czech Republic

3. Josep Balasch

   IMEC · KU Leuven

   Affiliation as printed

   KU Leuven, eMedia lab, Belgium

   KU Leuven, imec-COSIC/ESAT, Belgium

4. Martin Novotný

   Czech Technical University in Prague

   Affiliation as printed

   Czech Technical University in Prague, Faculty of Information Technology, Czech Republic

5. Nele Mentens Aachen

   Leiden University · IMEC · KU Leuven

   Affiliation as printed

   KU Leuven, ES&S, Belgium

   KU Leuven, imec-COSIC/ESAT, Belgium

   Leiden University, LIACS, The Netherlands